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Abstract 
Energy efficiency improvement is a desirable response to growing climate 
change and security of energy supply concerns. This paper studies the 
impacts of a varied set of macro-level market-oriented reforms as well as 
structural change on economy wide measure of energy efficiency across a 
group of transition countries. These countries experienced a rapid 
marketization process, which, since the early 1990s, transformed their 
economies from central planning towards market-driven models. We use a 
bias corrected fixed-effect analysis technique to estimate this effect for the 
1990-2010 period. The results suggest that reforms aimed at market 
liberalisation, financial sector and most infrastructure industries drove 
energy efficiency improvements. We find significant differences in 
improvements in energy efficiency between transitional Central European 
and Baltic States, South East Europe ones, and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. The reasons for these differences are also discussed. 
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1. Introduction and Purpose 
Systematic institutional changes in the early 1990s in former communist countries 
marked the end of central planning and paved the way for economy-wide market 
reforms as part of deep political, social and economic transformation. Twenty-nine 
countries of the Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
underwent these changes. Economic liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, 
restructuring and privatisation and institutional reforms were the main ingredients of 
their transformation process (Williamson, 1993). These reforms were termed Type I 
reforms while Type II reforms included the design and enforcement of laws, regulation 
and proper institutions to support and nurture the functioning of the market-driven 
reforms (Svejnar, 2002).  
 
The overall structural economic changes in these countries implied that their energy 
sectors also experienced marketization. However, the empirical evidence on the impacts 
of their macro-level economic reforms on energy efficiency, gauged by a macro-measure 
of energy efficiency, remains to be examined. Macro-energy efficiency is defined as the 
ratio of total energy consumed to GDP (see, e.g., Jaffe et al., 2004; Metcalf, 2008; Sue 
Wing, 2008; Gillingham et al., 2009)1. Several authors argue that energy intensity is a 
suitable indicator of macro-level energy efficiency and that its accuracy can increase by 
controlling for a range of economic, technological and behavioural factors (Filippini and 
Hunt, 2012). This examination is relevant considering that improving energy efficiency 
remains among the most intensely discussed and widely implemented targets in current 
energy and environmental policy (Brennan, 2013). 
                                                          
1
 Nevertheless, other measures of energy efficiency can be appropriate in different circumstances 
(Turner, 2013). 
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Existing studies suggest that market-oriented macroeconomic and sectoral reforms 
should promote energy efficiency due to the adoption of commercial policies and 
practises and increased openness to private investment (Anderson, 1995). 
Improvement in energy efficiency also coincides with the aim of improving overall 
economic productivity and competitiveness. Several economists argue that, a 
combination of privatization, regulatory reform and liberalisation should enhance 
economic efficiency and improve service standards in all economic sectors (Megginson 
and Netter, 2001). Efficient use of energy can bring energy costs down and free up 
resources that can be mobilized elsewhere more productively.  
Reliance on markets, both, as a resource-allocating agency and as an incentive 
mechanism can optimize energy allocation. Markets motivate consumers to reduce 
waste and adopt the most cost-reflective energy-saving equipment and appliances (Fan 
et al., 2007). Energy is also an intermediate input factor in production. Thus, effective 
market signals in the form of cost-reflective energy prices provide producers with 
incentives to decrease energy consumption by switching to substitutes when energy 
prices rise while market-driven reforms also subject the users to international energy 
prices. It can also induce energy saving technologies and innovations, which can lead to 
energy price decreases in the long-run (Popp, 2002)2. 
From a policymaking perspective, energy and economic efficiency can be considered to 
be complementary, though not always coincident as goals (Sutherland, 1991). In 
addition, liberalised policies should be aimed at making markets work better by 
eliminating market imperfections, mitigating market power through competition 
                                                          
2
 However, downward pressure on prices may induce a direct ‘rebound effect’ by promoting higher 
energy use and thereby energy inefficiency contradicting the actual motives of liberalised market driven 
reforms. Also, an increase in per capita real income due to market-based structural reforms may lead to 
higher consumption of energy through income effect and i.e. the indirect rebound effect. 
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policies, and internalizing environmental externalities such as climate change impacts 
using flexible market-based mechanisms (Joskow, 2001). Therefore, energy efficiency 
improvement is strongly linked with various policies aimed at strengthening the 
effectiveness of market economy and correcting the market failures (Labandeira and 
Linares, 2010).  
The purpose of this paper is to examine, by means of a panel data econometrics, the 
impacts of different market-oriented economic reforms on energy intensities using the 
macro-measure of energy efficiency during the two decades of market driven reforms in 
the transition economies (TECs hereafter). This examination is important given that 
existing empirical evidence, although debatable, indicates that energy intensities in 
transition countries declined because of more efficient energy use rather than because 
of underlying structural changes (or structural mix) in the economy (Zhang, 2013). On 
the other hand, capturing the impacts of induced and semi-autonomous technical 
change on energy intensities using econometric models is very complex (Conrad, 2000). 
Furthermore, energy efficiency promotion is a leading global policy response to the 
growing concerns on greenhouse gas emissions, energy security, costly renewable 
generation and transmission expansion (Brennan, 2013). Hence, the lessons drawn 
from the massive market-driven economic transformation process across the TECs 
could provide a helpful guide to policymakers undertaking energy efficiency reforms in 
other emerging economies such as China. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on 
the evolution of energy intensity in transition countries and the literature analysing the 
impacts of reforms on energy efficiency. Section 3 presents the data and methodology 
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while Section 4 illustrates the results. Section 5 discusses the findings. Finally, Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Evolution of Energy Efficiency and Relevant Literature  
The energy consumed per unit of GDP in the transition economies was historically 
estimated to be four to eight times that of the OECD countries and the United States 
(Gray, 1995). The legacy of central planning in the absence of effective market signals, 
use of energy inefficient technologies, available excess capacity in generation, excessive 
reliance on energy-intensive industries in many countries and the inefficiency in energy 
use (encouraged by low electricity prices) contributed to high energy-intensity in the 
region. Furthermore, the distorted energy prices and soft budget constraints for 
industry, such as being debt-free, led to high-energy use in the TECs.  
 
The state-owned firms were operationally and technically energy inefficient and had 
under-invested in energy efficiency before the start of the transition process. Despite 
this, the energy intensities of many TECs declined at the start of the transition process, 
mainly due to declining GDP, although the extent of this decline varied greatly across 
countries (Cornilie and Fankhauser, 2004). Structural changes such as the closure of 
dirty and inefficient plants as a result of privatisation coupled with the initial economic 
decline after political independence also contributed to this fall (Raiser et al., 2000).  
 
The energy intensities of less efficient countries have improved rapidly and the cross-
country variance in energy productivity have narrowed over time coinciding with the 
adoption of reforms (Zhang, 2013). Initially, the CIS countries were the most energy 
intensive of the groups of transition countries (see Figure 1) but have reduced their 
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energy intensity by about one-third since 1994 (EBRD, 2008). However, these countries 
compared to Western Europe still use three times more energy to produce a unit of GDP 
in terms of purchasing power parities (PPP) (Markandya et al., 2006). Countries such as 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have a high energy intensity of GDP indicating that they 
have the greatest potential to reduce their energy-efficiency gap whereas countries like 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Hungary have similar levels of energy intensities to those of the 
EU-15, OECD and the US in 2008.  
A number of studies have studied the impacts of market-oriented economic reforms on 
energy efficiency in the international context. Seabright et al. (1996), for example, 
argued that the promotion of open and competitive markets, removal of subsidies on 
energy prices and market based-energy conservation programs in many countries 
contributed to improvements in energy efficiency. China, being one of the rapidly 
growing economies, has gathered considerable attention among researchers on this 
subject. Sinton and Fridley (2000) concluded that energy efficiency improved in China 
since 1996 as a result of the shift from state-owned to collective, private and foreign 
invested ownership. Fisher-Vanden (2003) also argued that the implementation of 
market reforms can facilitate the shift towards less energy intensive production in the 
Chinese context using a dynamic computable general equilibrium analysis (CGE). 
Similarly, Fan et al. (2007) concluded that accelerated marketization contributed 
substantially to energy efficiency improvements in China by estimating the change in 
energy own-price elasticity, as well as the elasticity of substitutions between energy and 
non-energy resources (capital and labour) in China during the periods 1979-1992 and 
1993-2003.  
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In the regional context, three studies are of notable importance. Cornilie and 
Frankhauser (2004) study the evolution of energy intensities in the transition countries 
by decomposing the energy data and using panel data model based on random effects to 
identify the main factors driving improvements in energy intensity. The study concludes 
that energy prices and progress in enterprise restructuring are the two most significant 
drivers for efficient energy use. Similarly, a study by Markandya et al. (2006) 
investigates the relationship between twelve countries of Eastern Europe and the 
European Union (EU) members to examine convergence in energy intensities across 
them. A two-way fixed effects model is used to study the convergence in income and 
energy intensity between the advanced (EU 15) and the transition countries. While 
some evidence of convergence in energy intensity exists among the EU members and 
the transition countries; the findings suggest that the rate of convergence in energy 
intensities varies across countries. Zhang (2013) provide strong evidence of 
convergence of energy intensities where less energy efficient countries improved more 
rapidly and attributed this fall to a more efficient use rather than structural change in 
the transition countries. Hence, all three studies, confirm to the notion that the 
transition towards market-driven economic reforms contributed to a fall in energy 
intensities among the transition countries. 
 
However, there is a significant potential among the CIS countries to further reduce their 
energy intensities and eventually converge at a similar levels with the SEE and CEB 
countries in terms of per capita energy consumed per unit of GDP. On the other hand, 
the extent to which market-oriented economic reforms contributed to the declining 
average energy intensities across the transition region since reforms began remains to 
be examined.  
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Figure 1: Total primary energy consumption per unit of GDP (Btu per dollar in 2005 US$) 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
 
3. Methodology and Data  
This paper uses the ‘Transition Indicators’ developed by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to investigate the apparent impacts of macro-
level reform on macro-measure of energy efficiency in the transition countries since the 
start of the transition period. These indicators assess the progress of market-based 
reforms in transition economies. The degree to which reforms are made are assessed 
for nine areas encompassing 1) small scale privatization, 2) large scale privatization, 3) 
governance and enterprise restructuring, 4) price liberalisation, 5) trade and foreign 
exchange system, 6) competition policy, 7) banking reform and interest rate 
liberalisation, 8) securities markets and non-bank financial institutions and 9) 
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infrastructure includes electric power, railways, telecommunication, roads, water and 
waste water. The measurement scale for these indicators ranges continuously from 1 to 
4+, where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy while 
4+ represents the standards of an industrialized market economy. For example, a score 
of 4+ in the power sector reforms would imply that electricity tariffs are fully cost-
reflective and provide adequate incentives for efficiency improvements, the presence of 
large-scale private sector involvement in the unbundled and well-regulated sector and 
fully liberalised sector with well-functioning arrangements for network access and full 
competition in generation (EBRD, 2001; 2008). 
 
We construct six composite economic reform indicators (from the set of available nine 
indicators) to summarize and reflect the different types of market-driven economic 
reforms in the transition countries3: 
 
 Privatisation Reform Index (PRI): composite index based on un-weighted average of 
small-scale privatisation and large scale privatisation reforms. 
 Governance Reform Index (GRI):  composite index based on un-weighted average of 
competition policy and corporate governance and enterprise restructuring reforms. 
 Overall Market Liberalization Index (OMLRI): composite index based on un-weighted 
average of reforms in price liberalization and trade and foreign exchange reforms. 
 Other Infrastructure Reform Index (OINFRI): composite index based on un-weighted 
average of reform scores in roads, water and wastewater and telecommunication. 
                                                          
3 Hence, we consider all nine reform indicators in the model. We created 6 composite indexes from the 9 
indicators. 
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 Financial Reform Index (FRI): composite index based on un-weighted average of 
banking reform and interest rate liberalization and securities markets and non-bank 
financial institutions. 
 Electric Power Index (EPRI): electricity sector reform index alone. 
 
The reform index for the power sector is included as a separate reform variable from 
other infrastructural reforms. This is because the power sector reforms were critical in 
determining the pace and direction of overall economic reforms in these transition 
countries. The transformation of the power sector was one of the prominent 
components of the transition process because of the economic and technical 
characteristics of the sector. The sector primarily involved large sunk investments 
operated by regulated monopolies with significant links with national income and 
output (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012). We also control for the size of the manufacturing 
sector as a measure of structural change. This is because manufacturing was the 
cornerstone of the centrally planned economies as countries lurched towards rapid 
industrialisation based on heavy industries to foster economic growth (Zhang, 2013). 
Figure A in the Appendix plots the manufacturing share of GDP for the transition 
countries considered here. 
 
The data on energy intensities were obtained from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). Furthermore, the energy intensity estimates are adjusted for 
purchasing power parities (PPP) to remove the price level differences between 
countries. LEI denote the logarithmic transformed energy efficiency estimate, which 
captures the underlying distribution of the residuals used in our model. The shares of 
manufacturing sector in the economy (percentage of GDP) was used as a proxy measure 
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for structural change and was obtained from the United Nations (UN) database.  Table B 
in the Appendix reports the list of variables used in this study. 
 
The period of analysis ranges from 1990 to 2010 (20 years) and covering 27 countries. 
The year ‘1990’ marks the dawn of economic transformation in most of the transition 
countries. Some transition countries had already obtained membership in the EU in 
1990 while some were in the process of becoming EU members or had the potential for 
joining EU. Out of the 27 countries in our sample, 15 are associated with the EU while 7 
out of the 9 EU members in the sample belong to the CEB region. Turkey and 
Montenegro4 are excluded from the sample of countries studied due to the lack of data. 
We also exclude China from our study, since China does not belong to the sample of 
transition economies as defined in the study.  
 
The data comprises an unbalanced panel including 27 cross-sections with short time 
series of 20 years that captures the key reform period. We use the fixed effects (FE) 
estimator to account for unobserved heterogeneity given that the countries included in 
our sample are not identical to each other. Furthermore, the data used in this study does 
not represent a random sample as ‘N’ is limited but represents a finite sample allowing 
the use of FE estimator. However, the relationship between overall market-oriented 
economic reforms and energy efficiency is complex because the implementation of 
economic reforms does not instantaneously lead to improvements in energy efficiency. 
The behaviour of the dependent variable can depend upon the past values of itself along 
with a set of independent and control variables (Bruno, 2005). Thus a dynamic 
specification of the panel model is: 
                                                          
4
 Montenegro became an independent state on 3 June 2006.  
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yit = β0 + ρyit-1 + Xitβ + αi + ϵit     (1) 
 
where ‘ρ’ is the coefficient of the lagged value of the dependent variable while ‘Xitβ’ 
represents the matrix of explanatory variables and coefficients. In addition, it is well 
established in econometric literature that a dynamic LSDV model with a lagged 
dependent variable generates biased estimates when ‘T’ is small as is the case here 
(Roodman, 2009). The estimates obtained from a dynamic LSDV are not meaningful 
unless they are corrected for bias in small samples. Kiviet (1995) devised a bias-
corrected LSDV estimator applicable only for balanced panels, which is believed to have 
the lowest Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) for panels of all sizes (Bun and Kiviet, 
2003).  
 
Based on these previous works, a version of bias-corrected LSDV estimate (LSDVC) 
developed by Bruno (2005) is used given two fundamental assumptions: a) it has a 
strictly exogenous selection rule and b) the error term ‘ϵit’ is classified as ‘an 
unobserved white noise disturbance’. The approximation terms are of no direct use for 
estimation as they are all evaluated at the unobserved true parameter values. Hence, the 
true parameter values are replaced by estimates from some consistent estimator to 
make them work (Bruno, 2005). The preferred estimator is then plugged into the bias 
approximations formulae while the resulting bias approximation estimates βi_hat are 
subtracted to derive the corrected LSDV estimator as  
 
LSDVCi=LSDV- βi_hat     (2) 
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where i=1 in STATA by default indicates the accuracy of the bias approximation5. The 
consistent estimator to be chosen to initialize the bias corrections could vary, for 
example, between the Anderson-Hsiao (AH) and the Arellano-Bond (AB) estimators 
(Bruno, 2005). The AH estimator by transforming the data into first differences 
precludes the fixed effects and uses the second lags of the dependent variable (either 
differenced or in levels) as an instrument for the one-time differenced lagged dependent 
variable (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). The AB estimator is a GMM estimator for the first 
differenced model relying on a greater number of internal instruments (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). 
 
An alternative to dynamic LSDV panel estimates would be to use other consistent 
Instrumental Variable (IV) and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators 
(Roodman, 2009). However, the relative performance evaluation of LSDVC in 
comparison to LSDV, AH and BB estimators by Bruno (2005) for unbalanced panels 
with small ‘N’ concludes that the STATA computed LSDVC version outperforms all other 
estimators in terms of root mean square errors (RMSE) and bias. We thus use the 
LSDVC model to examine the impact of several market-driven economic reforms on 
energy efficiency in transition countries and report the results for the estimators used 
to initialize the bias corrections (AH and AB). The use of EBRD indexes based on scores 
of individual components as regressors also conforms to the exogenous selection rule as 
a requirement for performing LSDVC. Equation 3 examines the reform impacts on 
energy across the whole sample controlling for EU membership by introducing a 
                                                          
5 Using ‘xtlsdvc’ command in STATA, the estimator first produces uncorrected LSDV estimates which then 
approximates the sample bias of the estimator using Kiviet’s higher order asymptotic expansion 
techniques (Bruno, 2005). The estimation includes one lag by default. 
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dummy variable EUM while equation 4 models the reforms impacts on energy efficiency 
across the specific country groups (SEE, CEB and CIS).  
 
LEIit = β0 + ρLEIit-1+ β1PRIit+ β2OINFRIit+ β3GRIit+ β4FRIit+ β5OMLRIit+ β6EPRIit+ β7EUM+ β8SC + ϵit (3)        
LEIit = β0 + ρLEIit-1+ β1PRIit+ β2OINFRIit+ β3GRIit+ β4FRIit+ β5OMLRIit+ β6EPRIit+ β7SC + ϵit              (4) 
 
We do not explicitly capture the impacts of technological progress on energy intensities 
in our model. This is because there is strong evidence that much technical progress in 
the energy sector is induced and not autonomous which mostly depends on government 
R&D, corporate technology investment, learning by doing and scale economy effects in 
response to market conditions (Grubb and Kohler, 2000). New investments would 
imply that new technology is embodied in new equipment and especially in relation to 
economic activity and for some new consumer durables that involves the use of durable 
equipment. Induced technical change, in modelling terms, imply that technical change is 
reflected and dependent on other parameters within the model. As such, incorporating 
induced technical change in economic models, by making them endogenous to the 
model, is very complex as the modelling inherently becomes non-linear with path 
dependencies (Kohler et al., 2006)6.  
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables 
for the group of TCs covered in this article. In general, the results indicate that many 
transition countries have not fully met the economic reform standards of industrialised 
economies in all sectors. Thus, market-based economic transformation is an on-going 
process in many transition countries. It can be inferred that complete economic 
                                                          
6 There might be semi-autonomous technical change arising from cross-country spillovers. However, this 
is hard to capture in an econometric model.   
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liberalization (opening up trade, liberalising foreign exchange and price liberalization) 
has been on high agenda of reforms across the transition countries though the extent of 
progress varies considerably between them. 
 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
No. of 
Observations 
LEI 4.15 0.27 3.67 4.87 563 
SC 19.88 8.54 4.2 73.7 567 
PRI 2.94 0.98 1 4.17 567 
OINFRI 2.08 0.84 1 3.89 567 
GRI 2.05 0.73 1 3.67 567 
OMLRI 3.49 1.01 1 4.33 567 
FRI 2.18 0.86 1 4 567 
EPRI 2.29 0.97 1 4 567 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (up to two decimal places)  
Privatisation (both large scale and small scale), which is often perceived as a 
cornerstone of market-driven economic transformation process, has advanced ahead as 
compared to reforms in the financial sector and in the electric power sector on average. 
Likewise, the governance reform (including competition policy and corporate 
governance and enterprise restructuring reforms), also, a proxy measure for 
institutional reforms seems to have progressed the least. The low governance scores, to 
some extent, also explain the widespread corruption that these countries faced during 
the yesteryears (EBRD, 2008). 
Figure 2 shows the overall progress of market-driven reforms among the 9 EU countries 
included in our sample. It is evident that privatisation and reforms in overall market 
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liberalisation stalled after 2000 among the EU members while stagnation in reforms has 
occurred for all other sectors since 2005. The average reform score across all sectors is 
also above 3 in 2010 indicating that the standards of the industrialised economy have 
not been reached. The overall market liberalisation reforms progressed the most while 
the governance reforms progressed the least. The indices for reforms in the electric 
power sector and the financial sector have converged since 2006 among the EU 
members in transition.  
 
Figure 2: Reform progress among the SEE and CEB EU members  
(vertical axis denotes indexes) 
Similarly, Figure 3 shows the progress of reforms in all transition countries (considered 
here) by specific country groups. The privatisation programmes and overall market 
liberalisation seem to have stagnated in the CEB countries after 2000. Likewise, reforms 
in the electric power sector and financial sector stagnated after 2004. Since 2008, the 
overall market reforms have converged between the CEB and SEE countries while 
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reforms in governance and other infrastructure sectors are on-going among CEB 
countries. The prospect of joining the EU and thereby benefitting from regional 
integration encouraged and accelerated market reforms in the CEB and SEE regions and 
increased their economic openness. 
The SEE countries are still experiencing reforms in the financial, governance and the 
infrastructure sectors while reforms in other sectors seem to have stagnated. The SEE 
countries have some catching up to do in relation to the CEB countries apart from the 
reforms in overall market liberalisation. The CIS countries, on the other hand, lag 
behind both CEB and SEE countries in all aspects of reforms while governance reforms 
and reforms in other infrastructures seem to be the least pursued. However, these 
countries exhibited higher reform progress across all dimensions as compared to the 
SEE countries during the early phase of their transition. This indicates that the CIS 
countries mostly embraced a shock therapy approach to reforms in the early transition 
period and later resorted to a more gradual approach.  
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Figure 3: Reform progress in the TECs 
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4. Results  
The results for the whole sample from Table 2 indicate that overall market liberalisation 
and reform in other infrastructure sectors as well as in the financial sector were 
positively associated with energy efficiency improvements in the transition countries 
considered. Greater price liberalisation by phasing out state procurement at non-
market prices; no explicit price control; increased openness in trade and foreign 
exchange by removing all quantitative and administrative trade restrictions and 
reducing direct involvement of state in international trade seems to have improved 
energy efficiency in these countries. Market-driven reforms in energy intensive 
infrastructures (excluding the electricity sector) also led to energy efficiency 
improvements by greater reliance on the market process and signals, eliminating 
subsidies and adopting larger degree of decentralisation and commercialisation. 
Structural change in the economy, as captured by the share of manufacturing sector, 
had no effect on energy efficiency as a whole. 
 
LSDVC Dynamic Regression 
(Bootstrapped SE) 
Anderson-Hsiao 
(AH) 
Arellano-Bond 
(AB) 
LEI. L1 0.273*** 
(0.034) 
0.261*** 
(0.026) 
GRI 0.125*** 
(0.053) 
0.125*** 
(0.041) 
OMLRI -0.119*** 
(0.020) 
-0.118*** 
(0.017) 
OINFRI -0.195*** -0.194*** 
20 
 
(0.033) (0.025) 
EPRI 0.059** 
(0.021) 
0.058*** 
(0.014) 
FRI -0.087** 
(0.041) 
-0.087*** 
(0.032) 
PRI 0.043* 
(0.034) 
0.043** 
(0.022) 
SC -0.052 
(0.035) 
-0.054 
(0.041) 
EUM (dummy variable for EU 
membership) 
-0.073*** 
(0.036) 
-0.070*** 
(0.024) 
Table 2: Impacts of economic reforms on energy efficiency (whole sample) 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Numbers in ( ) reports the SE 
 
Similarly, the availability of substantial market liquidity and capitalisation coupled with 
well functioning and effectively regulated but competitive bank and non-banking 
financial institutions under financial sector reforms drove energy efficiency 
improvements in these countries. This result implies that liquidity constraints arising 
from capital market failures can deter energy efficiency improvements, as energy 
efficient investments cannot be financed. Hence, easing the liquidity constraints by 
increasing access to credit can drive the energy efficiency process as experienced in the 
transition countries.  
Table 3 shows the impacts of reforms on energy efficiency for specific groups of the 
TECs. Member countries of the EU are more energy efficient than the non-EU members 
within the TECs. The EU countries are already nearing the advanced stages of reforms 
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with the average reform scores being above 3 in all sectors at the end of 2010. The EU 
countries are further expected to undertake the energy efficiency improvements with 
the adoption of the Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU in October 2012.  
 
Country 
Groups 
SEE CEB CIS 
LSDVC 
Dynamic 
Regression 
(Bootstrapped 
SE) 
Anderson-
Hsiao 
(AH) 
Arellano-
Bond 
(AB) 
Anderson-
Hsiao 
(AH) 
Arellano-
Bond 
(AB) 
Anderson-
Hsiao 
(AH) 
Arellano-
Bond 
(AB) 
LEI. L1 -0.211 
(0.210) 
0.020 
(0.123) 
-0.467*** 
(0.038) 
-0.478*** 
(0.036) 
0.146 
(0.086) 
0.193 
(0.066) 
GRI 0.192 
(0.123) 
0.179 
(0.137) 
0.156*** 
(0.014) 
0.156*** 
(0.014) 
0.114 
(0.103) 
0.133* 
(0.051) 
OMLRI -0.139** 
(0.061) 
-0.156*** 
(0.029) 
-0.188*** 
(0.041) 
-0.185*** 
(0.042) 
-0.141*** 
(0.050) 
-0.139*** 
(0.017) 
OINFRI -0.139* 
(0.077) 
-0.154** 
(0.074) 
-0.056** 
(0.021) 
-0.052** 
(0.022) 
-0.249** 
(0.102) 
-0.253*** 
(0.039) 
EPRI 0.038 
(0.103) 
0.088 
(0.049) 
-0.017 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
0.079 
(0.056) 
0.074*** 
(0.040) 
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Table 3: Impacts of economic reforms on energy efficiency (specific groups) 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Numbers in ( ) reports the SE 
 
However, initially, privatisation, governance reforms and reforms in the electricity 
sector were associated with increased energy intensities among the TECs as indicated 
by our results. Privatisation was popularly pursued among the TECs, often as shock 
therapy measures, and occurred without appropriate institutional and legal framework 
implying inadequate governance mechanisms. The privatization efforts were also 
criticized due to poor selling processes and occurred under the 'velvet gloves' such as 
widespread corruption, lack of rules and transparency and lack of planning of the 
process (Stiglitz, 1999). Raising proceeds through the sale of state assets and reducing 
state deficit was the primary aim of mass privatisation in these countries rather than 
improving economic efficiency. Hence, privatisation did not coincide with 
improvements in energy efficiency. The governance reforms remain the least pursued 
reform on average among the TECs and were not significant enough to improve energy 
efficiency across these countries.  
 
Likewise, the progress of reforms in the electricity sector had an adverse effect on 
energy efficiency possibly because electricity prices continue to be subsidised and are 
FRI 0.209 
(0.126) 
0.227 
(0.144) 
-0.076*** 
(0.028) 
-0.075*** 
(0.017) 
-0.093* 
(0.113) 
-0.089** 
(0.049) 
PRI -0.126* 
(0.074) 
-0.122*** 
(0.043) 
0.128*** 
(0.036) 
0.127*** 
(0.036) 
0.109* 
(0.052) 
0.105*** 
(0.023) 
SC -0.306 
(0.034) 
-0.320 
(0.056) 
-0.336 
(0.024) 
-0.337* 
(0.026) 
-0.247 
(0.035) 
-0.338 
(0.029) 
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not necessarily cost-reflective in many transition and developing countries7. The 
electricity industry also remains vertically integrated in some of these countries. Hence, 
any progress of reforms in the electricity sector has not driven energy efficiency 
improvements. However, the impact of electricity sector reform progress on electricity 
intensities of these countries may shed a better light on the role of electricity sector 
reform progress among the TECs8. The results also show a weak evidence of structural 
change driving energy efficiency improvements only among the CEB countries while 
producing no significant impact for other countries. 
 
Similarly, reforms financial sector reforms are associated with the largest 
improvements in energy efficiency among the CIS countries. On the other hand, 
governance reforms negatively reflected to the energy efficiency of the CEB and CIS 
countries. This indicates that governance reforms remain weak even among the EU 
countries as a result of which the effect on energy efficiency is adverse. This finding is 
consistent with the view that the implementation and enforcement of economic reforms 
were weak as the state’s legal and judicial capacities were limited and constrained 
during the transition process (Stiglitz, 1999). Likewise, the reform progress in the 
electric power sector in the CIS also generated adverse impacts on energy efficiency. 
 
The results show the mixed impacts of privatisation on energy efficiency among the 
TECs. Privatisation improved energy efficiency among the SEE countries indicating that 
higher economic efficiency could have been a major aim of privatisation in this region. 
This result supports the earlier general theoretical and empirical findings that market-
                                                          
7 Figure 2 and Table 2 also support this argument. 
8 Nonetheless, a substantial fraction of energy use goes toward electricity generation indicating that 
energy intensity can be a proxy for electricity intensity in these countries. This implies that electricity 
reforms generate a similar impact on electricity intensity though this needs to be examined.  
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based instruments and policies, such as private ownership, can significantly improve 
the energy efficiency by improvements in economic efficiency and efficient resource 
allocation (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) and, in particular, China (Sinton and Fridley, 
2000; Fan et al., 2007). This underlines the importance of reducing excessive price 
support through government subsidies in improving energy efficiency in the SEE 
countries and imposing hard-budget constraints among firms in transition post-1990.. 
In contrast, privatisation had an adverse effect on energy efficiency improvements 
among the CEB and CIS countries.  
 
5. Discussion 
Our results send out two key messages to policymakers. Firstly, energy efficiency 
improvements may be achieved by pursuing policies designed to correct energy market 
failures and capital market failures through market pricing, reliance on market 
principles such as commercialisation and decentralisation and access to finance and 
loan programs. Secondly, energy efficiency improvement requires coordinated progress 
across all relevant sectors of the economy and the role of market driven reforms in 
other infrastructures apart from the energy sector should not be overlooked. 
 
The results from the econometric modelling in our study indicate that market related-
reforms are the primary influencers of energy efficiency for two major reasons9. This 
accords with that structural change has had an insignificant influence on energy 
intensities of transition countries, which our analysis confirms. Nonetheless, we cannot 
                                                          
9 Earlier study by Cornillie and Fankhauser (2004) also asumme that market related-reforms are the 
primary influencers of energy efficiency.   
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dismiss the possibility of some semi-autonomous changes in energy efficiency that is 
not captured by econometric modelling.  
Investments in new equipment both by producers and consumers would be associated 
with increased energy efficiency, as it tends to embody energy-saving technologies. 
Reforms in the financial sector imply that reforms might have led to increased 
international investments opportunities such as foreign investment inflow leading to 
increasing use of new technologies embodied in the new energy saving equipment. 
Cultural ties and geographical affinity may all play a role because they influence 
investment and economic growth although there is no clear consensus on the directions 
of the causality. For example, the CEB states potentially outpaced the SEE and CIS states 
in terms of higher economic growth and gross investments although the CEB states 
were already relatively ‘advanced’, had traditional links with the strongest EU nations, 
and benefitted quickly from investment and trade links with these countries. However, 
examining the energy efficient impacts of these factors require further explorations, 
which will also allow determining the extent to which more effective market reforms 
promoted energy intensities decline in transition countries. 
Nonetheless, the econometric model used in this paper builds on the notion that 
induced technological progress is endogenous to any underlying reform process 
because economic policies and institutional reforms reflect current know-how and 
political forces (Easterly and Levine, 2002). This implies that market-related reforms 
simulate the technological progress by providing cost-reflective price signals in the long 
run because the adjustment of economies to market reforms takes time. For example, 
most fixed capital and many consumer durables embody given technologies that can 
only be altered by investment in new capital. The limited substitutability between 
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capital and labour in the short-term should not be ignored. Adjustment in the stock of 
capital durable equipment takes time. Taking into account the theory of Salter (1966), 
about embodied technologies, alterations in the composition of the stock of durable 
equipment takes time, and time is needed to adopt new vintages of equipment which 
are developed to reflect changes in energy prices, Therefore, important lags occur in the 
changes in energy efficiency in response to price changes. Our model does not 
adequately account for these time lags. It would be desirable in future research to allow 
for these specifically. 
The lack of a complete data set also prevented us from incorporating relevant aspects 
such as behavioural changes related to energy conservation. This can be important 
because the reduction in physical energy used to produce an energy service (without 
any reduction in the price of that service) can depend on decisions to reduce the use of 
energy a given service rather than the technological change. Similarly, our model may 
not capture all the qualitative dimensions and steps involved in the reform process 
considering that all aspects of reform outcomes are readily quantifiable in physical and 
monetary units. Our model also does not capture the effect of the lagged reform 
variables on energy efficiency, as their effects can be distributed over-time. The relevant 
distributed lag can be different for different reform variables.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper provided an empirical contribution to the scarce literature examining the 
impacts of market-driven reforms on declining energy intensities among the transition 
countries. A bias corrected fixed effect panel data technique (LSDVC) was used for this 
purpose. The transition countries have experienced market-oriented economic reforms 
in all sectors of their economies since the start of the transition period (early 1990s).  
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The results from the LSDVC analysis suggest that market-driven reforms in overall 
market liberalisation, financial sector and other critical infrastructures (or network 
industries) were associated with the energy efficiency improvement during the twenty 
years of transition process (from 1990-2010). Countries joining the EU as a member 
also experienced improvements in energy efficiency while privatisation reforms 
generated a mixed effect on energy efficiency improvements. The SEE countries 
improved energy efficiency from privatisation reforms while the CEB and CIS countries 
initially (but not subsequently) experienced adverse impacts. The results indicate that 
market-driven policies aimed at correcting market failures in the infrastructure sector 
and capital market failures can help in promoting energy efficiency in developing and 
transition countries.  
Future research may focus on the interaction of the macro-level reforms and the effect 
of their interaction terms on energy efficiency. It is also important to pay attention to 
time lags in the adjustment of economic systems to market reforms. The efficacy of 
market-driven electricity sector reforms, which is now a global phenomenon, can be 
directly examined by analysing its impact on the electricity intensities of the transition 
countries. Alternative measures of energy efficiency needs be considered in the future 
analysis. Future research should also focus on addressing the effectiveness of market-
driven polices aimed at correcting market failures in innovation and adoption of 
energy-saving techniques, information problems, and potential behavioural failures 
affecting in improvements in energy efficiency in transition countries.   
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Appendix 
 
Central Eastern 
Europe and Baltic 
States (CEB) 
South Eastern 
Europe (SEE) 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
(CIS) 
Others 
Croatia**, Estonia*, 
Hungary*, Latvia*, 
Lithuania, Poland*, 
Slovak Republic* 
and Slovenia* 
Albania***, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina***, 
Bulgaria*, FYR 
Macedonia** , 
Serbia, Romania* 
and Montenegro*** 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan 
Turkey** and 
Mongolia 
*EU members, ** EU candidates and *** Potential EU candidates 
Table A: List of transition countries 
 
Figure A: Shares of Manufacturing Sector as a percentage of total GDP 
Source: UN 
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Type Variables Description Units Source 
Dependent 
Variables 
LEI Energy Intensity 
(log transformed) 
Energy Use per 
$1000 GDP (PPP 
adjusted) 
EIA 
Control 
Variable 
SC Structural Change Percentage Share 
of GDP 
UN 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
EPRI Electric Power 
Reform Index 
Scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
PRI Privatisation Reform 
Index 
Scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
OINFRI Other infrastructure 
Reform Index 
Scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
FRI Financial Reform 
Index 
Scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
GRI Governance Reform 
Index 
Scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
OMLRI Overall Market 
Liberalization 
Reform Index 
Scaled from 1 to 
4+ 
EBRD 
Table B: List of variables 
 
